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ABSTRACT. There are two distinct ways for someone to place conditions on their
morally valid consent. The first is to place conditions on the moral scope of their
consent—whereby they waive some moral claim rights but not others. The second
is to conditionally token consent—whereby the condition affects whether they
waive any moral claim rights at all. Understanding this distinction helps make
progress with debates about so-called ‘‘conditional consent’’ to sexual intercourse
in English law, and with understanding how individuals place conditions on their
morally valid consent in other contexts.
An English court recently had to decide whether to extradite Wi-
kiLeaks founder Julian Assange to Sweden to face rape charges.
Discussing Assange’s interactions with a woman known as AA, the
court said, ‘‘If AA had made it clear that she would only consent to
sexual intercourse if Mr Assange used a condom,’’ then a jury could
hold that ‘‘there would be no consent if … he did not use a con-
dom’’.1 Subsequent legal judgments appear to suggest that it is
possible for someone to consent to sexual intercourse on the con-
dition that their partner does not ejaculate inside them,2 or on the
condition that their partner is a cisgender man.3 According to the
Crown Prosecution Service, these judgments suggest a ‘‘developing
concept of conditional consent’’. But the CPS notes the ‘‘absence of
clear authority as to how far the concept extends’’.4 Legal com-
mentators likewise observe that the courts must now address
1 Assange v. Swedish Prosecution Authority [2011] EWHC 2849 (Admin) at [86].
2 R (on the application of F) v. DPP and A [2013] EWHC 945 (Admin).
3 R v. McNally [2013] EWCA Crim 1051.
4 Crown Prosecution Service, Rape and Sexual Offences, Chapter 3: Consent, <https://www.cps.
gov.uk/legal-guidance/rape-and-sexual-offences-chapter-3-consent> (accessed 13 October 2020).
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‘‘whether the concept of conditional consent ought to be extended
to other situations’’.5
The recent judgments cast doubt on previous judgments, in
which the courts took the view that the defendant had the com-
plainant’s legally valid consent to sexual intercourse despite
breaching the complainant’s condition that he not have HIV,6 or that
the two be married beforehand.7
Perhaps the most famous of these older judgments is Linekar, in
which a prostitute consented to Linekar having sexual intercourse
with her on the condition that he pay her £25 afterwards.8 After
having sexual intercourse with the prostitute, however, Linekar
absconded without paying her. The court took the view that the
prostitute had given legally valid consent to Linekar having sexual
intercourse with her.
Should the law of conditional consent be extended to cases like
Linekar? The existing academic literature leaves the answer to this
question unsettled because contributors to that literature differ in
their intuitions about cases like Linekar. Some commentators have
the intuition that there is an important difference between cases like
Assange and those like Linekar.9 They might be prepared to believe
that a defendant who has sexual intercourse with a complainant in
breach of a condom-wearing condition lacks the complainant’s valid
consent to his having sexual intercourse with her. But they find it
hard to believe that the same is true of a defendant who has sexual
intercourse with a complainant in breach of a payment condition.
Other commentators have different intuitions about cases like Line-
5 Gavin A. Doig and Natalie Wortley, ‘‘Conditional Consent? An Emerging Concept in the Law of
Rape’’ Journal of Criminal Law 77(4) (2013): pp. 286–291, p. 291.
6 R v. Dica (Mohammed) [2004] EWCA Crim 1103; R v. Konzani (Feston) [2005] EWCA Crim 706.
7 R v. Papadimitropoulos (1957) 98 CLR 249 (High Court of Australia).
8 R v. Linekar (Gareth) [1995] QB 250 (Court of Appeal, Criminal Division). The case report leaves the
precise details of the condition unclear. One leading criminal law textbook describes it as a case in which
‘‘payment was the condition of consent’’. Andrew P. Simester et al., Simester and Sullivan’s Criminal Law
(6th ed., Oxford: Hart, 2016), p. 794. But others describe Linekar as a case in which it was not payment,
but rather Linekar’s promise of payment, which was the condition of consent. G. Syrota, ‘‘Rape: When
Does Fraud Vitiate Consent?’’ Western Australia Law Review 25 (1995): pp. 334–345. See also the
discussion in R v. Jheeta [2007] EWCA 1699 at [27]. Since the former view is more common, I assume it
for simplicity.
9 See Joel Feinberg, Harm to Self (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 300. See also Joan
McGregor, Is it Rape? On Acquaintance Rape and Taking Women’s Sexual Consent Seriously (London:
Routledge, 2005), p. 186; Alan Wertheimer, Consent to Sexual Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2003), p. 207. Each of these authors discusses consent induced by deception rather than
conditional consent, but I speculate that their position would be similar with respect to both issues.
Indeed, as I say in fn13, the existing literature does not always clearly distinguish these two issues.
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kar. They believe that there is no relevant difference between
someone consenting on the condition that their partner wears a
condom, and someone consenting on the condition that their part-
ner pays them afterwards. A defendant who has sexual intercourse
with a complainant in breach of either condition lacks the com-
plainant’s valid consent to his action.10 Liberal sexual morality, they
say, requires us to respect ‘‘individuals’ freedom to set their own
limits to their consent, be these wide or narrow.’’11 On this view, it is
illiberal to treat sexual intercourse in breach of some conditions but
not others as lacking valid consent. Individuals should, in light of
their own conception of the sexual good, be able to place whatever
conditions they like on their sexual consent.
In this essay, I advance two theses. The first, and most important,
is that there are two distinct ways for A to place conditions on her
morally valid consent. One is for A to restrict the moral scope of her
consent—whereby she waives some moral claim rights but not
others. The other is for A to conditionally token consent—whereby
the condition affects whether A waives any moral claim rights at all.
My second thesis is that understanding the distinction between
moral scope restriction and conditional tokening helps make pro-
gress with legal debates about so-called ‘‘conditional consent’’ to
sexual intercourse in English law. To help make progress with those
legal debates, I start by assuming that if B has sexual intercourse with
A without A’s morally valid consent to B’s doing so, then B’s action
constitutes a moral wrong that ought to be criminalised.12 More
generally, I make what I shall call the Tracking Assumption:
Tracking Assumption: Whether A gives legally valid consent to B’s action ought to track whether
A gives morally valid consent to that action.
I argue that, given some plausible assumptions, the defendant acts
without the complainant’s morally valid consent to his action both in
Assange and in cases like Linekar. Accordingly, I argue that it ought to
be the case that he lacks the complainant’s legally valid consent to
his action. We shall see, however, that it does not follow
10 Jonathan Herring, ‘‘Does Yes Mean Yes? The Criminal Law and Mistaken Consent to Sexual
Activity’’ Singapore Law Review 22 (2002): pp. 182–201; Jonathan Herring, ‘‘Mistaken Sex’’ Criminal Law
Review (2005): pp. 511–524. Herring is concerned primarily with consent induced by mistake, though in
‘‘Does Yes Mean Yes?’’ he often writes in terms of conditions on consent.
11 Simon Gardner, ‘‘Appreciating Olugboja’’ Legal Studies 16(3) (1996): pp. 275–297, p. 281.
12 See Tom Dougherty, ‘‘Consent, Communication, and Abandonment’’ Law and Philosophy 38
(2019): pp. 387–405, pp. 387–88.
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automatically that the defendant’s behaviour should be criminalised
using the same offence in each kind of case. Indeed, I suggest that
each set of commentators on cases like Assange and Linekar plausibly
gets something right. One set of commentators is correct that in
both kinds of case, the defendant acts without the complainant’s
morally valid consent to his action. But the other set of commen-
tators may be correct that there is an important moral difference
between the two kinds of case—a difference in why the defendant
lacks the complainant’s morally valid consent to his action. If that is
correct, the difference should, I suggest, be reflected in different
offences in the criminal law.
The essay is arranged as follows. In section I, ‘Conditional Con-
sent or Deception’, I distinguish the issue of conditional consent
from the issue of consent induced by deception. In section II, ‘A’s
Giving Morally Valid Consent to B’s Action’, I outline the familiar
picture of how A gives morally valid consent to B’s action, and how
this picture explains how A places conditions on such consent. On
this picture, A places conditions on her morally valid consent to B’s
action by restricting the moral scope of her consent, thereby waiving
some moral claim rights but not others. In section III, ‘Conditionally
Tokening Consent’, I introduce the notion of A conditionally tokening
consent—a distinct and hitherto unnoticed way for A to place con-
ditions on her morally valid consent to B’s action. I argue that there
are two reasons to believe that it is possible for A to conditionally
token consent to B’s action. In section IV, ‘Legal Implications’, I
suggest how the law of conditional consent to sexual intercourse
should develop in light of the distinction between moral scope
restriction and conditional tokening.
I. CONDITIONAL CONSENT OR DECEPTION?
Importantly, I am concerned with whether the law of conditional
consent should be extended to cases like Linekar.13 I am not in this
essay concerned with the distinct—though important—issue of
deception in these cases. Assange at least arguably deceived AA
13 Thanks to the anonymous reviewers for encouraging me to spell out the distinction between
conditional consent and deception. The existing academic literature does not always clearly distinguish
these two issues. See, e.g., Herring, ‘‘Does Yes Mean Yes?’’; Hyman Gross, ‘‘Rape, Moralism, and
Human Rights’’ Criminal Law Review (2007): pp. 220–227, pp. 223–24.
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about whether he was wearing a condom when having sexual
intercourse with her. And Linekar deceived the prostitute insofar as
he never sincerely intended to pay her.14 Deception is at least
sometimes sufficient to prevent a complainant from giving morally
valid consent to the defendant having sexual intercourse with her.
While clearly important, the issue of deception is distinct from the
issue of conditional consent.
To illustrate how the issues of conditional consent and deception
can come apart, we can consider a fictional variant of Assange called
Condom.
Condom. Amrit tells Bilal, ‘‘I consent to your having sexual intercourse with me on the condition
that you wear a condom.’’ Without noticing that the condom has come off, Bilal has sexual
intercourse with Amrit.
If Assange really does involve a concept of conditional consent (rather
than merely being a case about consent induced by deception), then
that concept applies in Condom. Bilal has sexual intercourse with
Amrit without her legally valid consent. This is not due to any
deception on Bilal’s part. Indeed, Bilal’s behaviour is not deceptive.
Rather, it is because Bilal has sexual intercourse with Amrit in breach
of her condition that he wear a condom. I believe that this is the
correct analysis of Condom. I believe that Bilal lacks Amrit’s legally
valid consent to his having sexual intercourse with her. I also believe
that this is how the law ought to be. This is because Bilal lacks
Amrit’s morally valid consent to his having sexual intercourse with
her, and according to the Tracking Assumption, legally valid consent
ought to track morally valid consent.
Importantly, this analysis does not commit us to criminalising
Bilal’s behaviour. In having sexual intercourse with Amrit without
her legally valid consent, Bilal commits the actus reus of a sexual
offence. Precisely which sexual offence depends on precisely which
acts the sexual intercourse involves.15 To warrant criminalisation,
Bilal must have committed the actus reus with the relevant culpa-
bility or mens rea.16 There is a substantive question about what level
of culpability the law should require before holding a defendant
criminally liable, i.e., about how to calibrate the mens rea require-
14 Similar things can be said of R (on the application of F) v. DPP and A and R v. McNally.
15 See Sexual Offences Act 2003, ss 1 (rape), 2 (assault by penetration), and 3 (sexual assault).
16 For helpful discussion of the relationship between mens rea and actus reus in criminal offences, see
Andrew P. Simester et al., Simester and Sullivan’s Criminal Law 19–20.
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ment. One option is to hold a defendant criminally liable only if he
acted intentionally. Other options include holding a defendant liable
only if he acted recklessly, or perhaps even negligently. If a defendant
is truly innocent, then he should not be subject to criminal liability.
However we calibrate the mens rea requirement, the law should still
recognise that Bilal commits the serious moral wrong of having
sexual intercourse with Amrit without her morally valid consent,
even if he does so non-culpably. The Tracking Assumption enables
the law to do just this, by recognising that Bilal commits the actus
reus of a sexual offence.17
II. A’S GIVING MORALLY VALID CONSENT TO B’S ACTION
Having clarified that I am concerned with conditional consent, I turn
in this section to summarising a familiar picture of the role of mo-
rally valid consent and its relation to our moral rights. This includes
outlining three requirements for A’s giving morally valid consent to
B’s action, and how the familiar picture explains how A places
conditions on this consent.
The familiar picture starts with the idea that each of us possesses
general moral rights over our person and property. These general
moral rights consist in more specific rights against specific interac-
tions by specific individuals. For example, each of us possesses a
moral claim right against it being the case that [others-have-sexual-
intercourse-with-us], and others owe us the correlative moral duty
not to have sexual intercourse with us. Likewise, each of us possesses
a claim right against it being the case that [others-enter-our-home],
and others owe us the correlative moral duty not to enter. These
claim rights create moral defaults: if others have sexual intercourse
with us or enter our homes, the moral default is that they infringe
our moral claim rights and breach the correlative moral duties. By
giving our morally valid consent to others performing these actions,
we displace the moral default. We waive the relevant moral claim
right and release others from the correlative moral duty.18
17 Thanks to the reviewers for encouraging me to spell out the implications of my view for when we
should hold a defendant criminally liable.
18 This picture of morally valid consent broadly follows that of JJ Thomson in The Realm of Rights
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990). Thomson herself builds on Wesley Hohfeld’s ac-
count of legal rights. For a broadly Thomsonian account of morally valid consent in the sexual domain,
see Tom Dougherty, ‘‘Sex, Lies, and Consent’’ Ethics 123(4) (2013): pp. 717–744.
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For A to give morally valid consent to B’s action, three require-
ments must be satisfied. First, A must token consent. Second, A’s
token must be morally valid. Third, B’s action must fall within the
moral scope of A’s consent. Let us consider each of these requirements
in turn, before turning to the issue of how A places conditions on
this consent.
A. The Tokening Requirement
First, A must token consent.19 For A to token consent is for A to
perform an act that constitutes an act of consent. There are differing
views about precisely what A must do to token consent. According
to the mental state view, it is possible for A to token consent purely
mentally. For A to token consent, proponents of the mental state
view maintain, it is sufficient for A to hold some purely mental
attitude or to perform some purely mental act. Proponents of the
mental state view disagree about the particular mental attitude or act
required of A. For example, according to one suggestion, for A to
token consent to B’s action, A must intend B’s action.20 According to
another, A must think to herself that B’s action is ‘‘okay with me’’.21
Proponents of the speech act view disagree with proponents of the
mental state view. According to the speech act view, for A to per-
form a token of consent requires not only that A holds a particular
mental attitude, but also that A communicates that attitude to B. On
this view, tokening consent requires the performance of a speech act
19 For the language of ‘‘tokening’’ consent, see Franklin G. Miller and Alan Wertheimer, ‘‘Preface to
a Theory of Consent Transactions’’ in Franklin G. Miller and Alan Wertheimer (eds) The Ethics of
Consent: Theory and Practice (Oxford: OUP, 2010) pp. 79–106. Other writers call this ‘‘assent’’, though this
is a purely terminological difference. See Kimberly Kessler Ferzan and Peter Westen, ‘‘How to Think
(Like a Lawyer) About Rape’’ Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (2017): pp. 759–800.
20 Heidi Hurd, ‘‘The Moral Magic of Consent (I)’’ Legal Theory 2 (1996): pp. 121–146.
21 Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, ‘‘Consent, Culpability, and the Law of Rape’’ Ohio State Journal of
Criminal Law 13(2) (2016): pp. 397–439. For other suggestions, see, e.g., Larry Alexander ‘‘The Moral
Magic of Consent (II)’’ Legal Theory 2 (1996): pp. 165–174; Larry Alexander, ‘‘The Ontology of Consent’’
Analytic Philosophy 55 (2014): pp. 102–113.
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(though performance of the speech act does not necessarily require
‘‘uptake’’ from B).22 The relevant speech act will often involve A
verbally communicating with B, though it need not. For example, it
is possible for a thumbs up to constitute a speech act of consent, if A
intends it to communicate an attitude of consent.
In this essay, I shall assume that the speech act view is correct,
because the speech act view makes it easiest to illustrate the idea of
conditionally tokening consent. However, I believe it may be pos-
sible to conditionally token consent on at least some versions of the
mental state view—an issue to which I shall briefly return below.23
B. The Validity Requirement
The second requirement is that A’s token of consent must be morally
valid. For A’s token of consent to be morally valid, I assume that A
must be an adult of sound mind whose token of consent is not
induced by coercion or deception.24 I shall assume that this
requirement is satisfied in all the fictional cases I discuss.
C. The Moral Scope Requirement
Third, B’s action must fall within the moral scope of A’s consent.25 To
illustrate, consider Gynaecologist:
22 See, e.g., Tom Dougherty, ‘‘Yes Means Yes: Consent as Communication’’ Philosophy and Public
Affairs 43(3) (2015): pp. 224–253; Monica R. Cowart, ‘‘Understanding Acts of Consent: Using Speech Act
Theory to Help Resolve Moral Dilemmas’’ Law and Philosophy 23(5) (2004): pp. 495–525; H.M. Malm,
‘‘The Ontological Status of Consent and its Implications for the Law of Rape’’ Legal Theory 2 (1996): pp.
147–164. On the issue of ‘‘uptake’’ from B, see Neil C. Manson, ‘‘Permissive Consent: A Robust Reason-
Changing Account’’ Philosophical Studies 173 (2016): pp. 3317–3334; Victor Tadros, Wrongs and Crimes
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 205–209; Tom Dougherty, The Scope of Consent (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, forthcoming) ch. 6.
23 See fn. 34, below.
24 On coercion, see, e.g., Japa Pallikkathayil, ‘‘The Possibility of Choice: Three Accounts of the
Problem with Coercion’’ Philosophers’ Imprint 11(16) (2011): pp 1–20. On deception, see, e.g., Dougherty,
‘‘Sex, Lies, and Consent’’. Dougherty’s argument concerns the moral scope of consent induced by
deception. However, it has sometimes been interpreted as an argument about the validity of such
consent. See, e.g., Campbell Brown, ‘‘Sex Crimes and Misdemeanours’’ Philosophical Studies 177 (2020):
pp. 1363–1379, p. 1374; Chloë Kennedy, ‘‘Criminalising Deceptive Sex: Sex, Identity, and Recognition’’
Legal Studies (2020): pp. 1–20, p. 5 fn. 22. It is partly to avoid such confusions that I address tokening,
validity, and moral scope separately in this essay.
25 For a detailed discussion of the moral scope of consent, see Tom Dougherty, The Scope of Consent.
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Gynaecologist. Patient says to Doctor, ‘‘I consent to your inserting a medical instrument into my
vagina.’’ Patient is an adult of sound mind whose token of consent is not induced by coercion or
deception. Instead of inserting a medical instrument into patient’s vagina, however, Doctor
inserts his penis.26
In Gynaecologist, Patient does give morally valid consent to Doc-
tor’s doing something—namely, inserting a medical instrument into
Patient’s vagina. But Doctor does something else, outside the moral
scope of Patient’s consent. As one nineteenth century judge put it,
‘‘the act consented to is not the act done. Consent to a surgical
operation or examination is not consent to sexual connection’’.27
Reflecting on Gynaecologist might lead us to assume that the
moral scope of A’s consent is given simply by the descriptive content
of A’s consent token.28 After all, in Gynaecologist, the moral scope of
Patient’s consent includes Patient’s moral claim right against it being
the case that [Doctor-inserts-a-medical-instrument-into-Patient’s-va-
gina], but excludes Patient’s moral claim right against it being the
case that [Doctor-inserts-his-penis-into-Patient’s-vagina]. And the
descriptive content of Patient’s consent token includes Doctor’s
inserting a medical instrument into Patient’s vagina, but excludes
Doctor’s inserting his penis into her vagina. These two features of
Gynaecologist might lead us to assume that the moral scope of A’s
consent is given simply by the descriptive content of A’s consent
token.
But this is not quite right.29 To see this, consider Pen:
Pen. Penelope owns a car and mistakenly believes she also owns a pen. The pen actually belongs
to Rex. Pointing to each item in turn, Penelope says to Quintin, ‘‘I consent to your borrowing
this car and using this pen.’’
In Pen, the descriptive content of Penelope’s token of consent
includes both Quintin’s borrowing the car and Quintin’s using the
pen. However, the moral scope of Penelope’s consent—the set of
26 For a similar legal case, see, e.g., R v. Flattery (1877) QBD 410. Flattery has at least two compli-
cating features which Gynaecologist avoids. First, the complainant in Flattterymay have been a minor and
so incapable of giving morally valid consent. Second, Flattery deceived the complainant about his
intentions, which may also have undermined the moral validity of her consent.
27 R v. Clarence (1889) 22 QBD 23, 44.
28 Since I assume that a consent token is a speech act, I assume that the descriptive content of the
token is given by the content of that speech act. However, proponents of the mental state view may
hold that the descriptive content of a consent token is fixed by the content of the relevant mental
attitude. For example, if for A to token consent to B’s action is for A to intend B’s action, then the
content of A’s consent token may be fixed by the content of A’s intentions.
29 See Neil C. Manson, ‘‘How Not to Think About the Ethics of Deceiving into Sex’’ Ethics 127
(2017): pp. 415–429, pp. 423–428; ‘‘Permissive Consent’’, pp. 3319–3320.
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moral claim rights she waives by tokening consent—covers only her
claim right against it being the case that [Quintin-borrows-the-car].
Penelope lacks a moral claim right against it being the case that
[Quintin-uses-the-pen], because Rex rather than Penelope is the pen’s
true owner. Since Penelope lacks any moral claim rights over the
pen, she cannot waive any such rights by consenting. It is true that if
Quintin were to use the pen, he would not infringe Penelope’s
rights. But this is not because Penelope gives morally valid consent
to Quintin’s using the pen. Rather, it is because Penelope lacks any
moral claim rights over the pen in the first place. The lesson from
Pen is this: It is possible for A to waive a moral claim right against B’s
action only if A initially possesses a claim right against B’s
performing that action.30 Provided A’s consent token is morally
valid, A’s consent token waives a moral claim right against B’s action
if and only if two requirements are satisfied. First, B’s action must be
within the descriptive content of A’s consent token. Second, A must
initially possess a claim right against B’s performing that action.
D. The Familiar Picture and Conditions on Morally Valid Consent
Reflecting on the familiar picture of morally valid consent, we can
see that A’s morally valid consent to B’s action always involves
conditions. For example, in Gynaecologist, Patient gives morally valid
consent to Doctor inserting something into her vagina on the con-
dition that it is a medical instrument. On the familiar picture, such
conditions restrict the moral scope of consent. Patient waives her
moral claim right against it being the case that [Doctor-inserts-a-
medical-instrument-into-Patient’s-vagina], but not her moral claim
right against it being the case that [Doctor-inserts-his-penis-into-Pa-
tient’s-vagina].
III. CONDITIONALLY TOKENING CONSENT
In this section, I introduce a second way for A to place conditions on
her morally valid consent to B’s action. The second way is for A to
30 This is true at least where A consents on her own behalf. Things may be different, for example,
where a parent gives morally valid consent to a surgeon operating on their infant. Since one cannot give
morally valid consent to sexual intercourse on behalf of another person, I leave this complication aside in
this essay.
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conditionally token consent. Since A’s tokening consent is a require-
ment for A’s giving morally valid consent to B’s action, A’s placing
conditions on her consent token is a way for A to place conditions on
her morally valid consent to B’s action. If the condition on A’s
tokening is not satisfied, then A does not token consent. And if A
does not token consent, then A does not give her morally valid
consent to anything at all. In this section, I first illustrate the idea of
conditionally tokening consent. I then argue that there are two
distinct reasons to believe that it is possible for A to conditionally
token consent to B’s action—one based on what it takes to token
consent, and another based on A’s rights.
A. Conditionally Tokening Consent: An Illustration
To illustrate the idea of conditionally tokening consent, consider
Mother:
Mother. On Monday, Aliyah says to Beau, ‘‘If you visit your mother on Wednesday, I hereby
consent to your entering my apartment on Friday.’’
In Mother, a condition of Aliyah’s tokening consent to Beau’s
entering her apartment on Friday is that he visits his mother on
Wednesday. If Beau does not visit his mother on Wednesday, then
Aliyah does not token consent. If Aliyah does not token consent,
then Aliyah does not give her morally valid consent to Beau’s
entering her apartment.
Let us now turn to the two reasons to believe it is possible for A
to conditionally token consent.
B. Speech Acts
This first reason to believe that it is possible for A to conditionally
token consent concerns what it takes to token consent. I have as-
sumed that the speech act view of consent is correct—that a consent
token requires a speech act. If this is correct, then we should expect
consent tokens to function like other speech acts. More specifically, if
consent is a speech act by which we exercise a normative power, we
should expect it to function like other speech acts by which we
exercise normative powers.31 Other speech acts by which we exer-
31 On normative powers, see David Owens, Shaping the Normative Landscape (Oxford: OUP, 2012).
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cise normative powers include commands and promises. Some work
in the philosophy of language suggests that it is possible for A to
conditionally token commands and promises. If this is correct, then
this gives us reason to believe that it is also possible for A to con-
ditionally token consent.
To see why some philosophers of language believe it is possible to
conditionally token a command, consider Bandages:
Bandages. Doctor says to Nurse, ‘‘If the patient is alive in the morning, change the bandages.’’
One possible way to think of Bandages is as a case in which Doctor
tokens command of a conditional. On this picture, Doctor tokens his
command unconditionally. But the descriptive content of the token
is conditional. However, if the conditional involved is the ordinary
material conditional from propositional logic, then this has unhappy
implications. On this picture, Bandages involves Doctor commanding
Nurse to make it the case either that Nurse changes the bandages in
the morning, or that the patient is not alive in the morning. On this
picture, Nurse could obey the command by killing the patient. To
avoid this unhappy conclusion, Dorothy Edgington advances a view
of Bandages according to which Doctor conditionally performs the
speech act of commanding the Nurse to change the bandages—the
condition being that the patient is still alive in the morning. If the
patient is not alive in the morning, then, on Edgington’s view,
Doctor has not performed the speech act of commanding Nurse to
change the bandages.32 If a speech act of command is what it takes to
token a command, then if the condition on Doctor’s speech act is not
satisfied, then Doctor does not token command Nurse to change the
bandages. Since tokening a command is a requirement for giving a
morally valid command, it follows that if the patient is not alive in
the morning, Doctor does not give Nurse a morally valid command
to change the bandages.
Likewise, some philosophers believe it is possible to conditionally
token a promise. Margaret Gilbert calls this phenomenon an exter-
nally conditional promise. As she explains, ‘‘The condition of an ex-
ternally conditional promise is a condition for the existence of the
32 Dorothy Edgington, ‘‘On Conditionals’’ Mind 104(44) (1995): pp. 235–329, p. 287. Indeed, Edg-
ington holds the stronger view that ‘‘[a]ny kind of speech act can be performed unconditionally or
conditionally. There are conditional questions, commands, promises, agreements, offers, etc.’’ See also,
Dorothy Edgington, ‘‘Conditionals’’, in Lou Goble (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Philosophical Logic
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2001) pp. 385–414, p. 410.
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[speech act of] promise as such.’’ Gilbert gives the following exam-
ple: ‘‘On the condition that you do the laundry today, I promise to
mow the lawn tomorrow.’’33 This constitutes my speech act of
promising to mow the lawn tomorrow, conditional on it being the
case that you do the laundry today. If you do not do the laundry
today, then I have not performed the speech act of promising to
mow the lawn tomorrow. Now, performing the speech act of
promising is a requirement for tokening a promise, and tokening a
promise is a requirement for my giving you a morally valid promise.
Accordingly, if you do not do the laundry today, then I have not
given you a morally valid promise to mow the lawn tomorrow.
If it is possible for A to conditionally token commands and pro-
mises, then we have reason to believe that it is also possible for A to
conditionally token consent.34
C. Rights
There is a second reason to believe that it is possible for A to
conditionally token consent. The second reason is especially
important for those who deny the Conjunction Thesis:
Conjunction Thesis. If A possesses a moral claim right against it being the case that [p], then it
follows that for any proposition q, A also possesses a moral claim right against it being the case
that [both p and q].35
33 Margaret Gilbert, ‘‘Is an Agreement an Exchange of Promises?’’ Journal of Philosophy 90(12) (1996):
pp. 626–649, p. 633. See also Charles Fried, Contract as Promise (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1981) pp. 46–47.
34 I have assumed both that tokening consent requires a speech act, and that Edgington and Gilbert’s
analyses of conditional speech acts is correct. Both these assumptions might be challenged. First,
Edgington and Gilbert’s analyses of conditional speech acts might be incorrect. (See, respectively,
Angelika Kratzer, Modals and Conditionals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) and Luca Ferrero,
‘‘Conditional Intentions’’ Noûs 43(4) (2009): pp. 700–741, fn. 30.) If Edgington and Gilbert’s analyses are
incorrect, this would show at most that the correct account of conditionally tokening consent is not the
one that follows naturally from their analyses. It would not be fatal to the main thesis of this essay,
which is that moral scope restriction and conditional tokening are two distinct ways to place conditions
on morally valid consent. This becomes even clearer when we consider the possibility that tokening
consent does not require a speech act. We can ask: if the mental state view is correct, is it nevertheless
possible for A to conditionally token consent to B’s action? The answer depends on precisely which
mental attitude or mental action is sufficient for tokening consent. For example, according to one
version of the mental state view, for A to token consent to B’s action is for A to intend B’s action. (See
fn. 20, above.) If this is correct, then it may be possible for A to conditionally token consent to B’s action
if A conditionally intends B’s action. (On conditional intentions, see Ferrero, ‘‘Conditional Intentions’’.)
35 Strictly speaking, these rights are always held against another individual, B. To state this explicitly
on every occasion would complicate the discussion without adding to the analysis.
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To understand the issue, consider first those who accept the
Conjunction Thesis. Those who accept the Conjunction Thesis do
not need to invoke conditional tokening for their view to be
extensionally adequate, for they can explain any condition in terms
of moral scope restriction. On their view, if A wants to give morally
valid consent to it being the case that p if and only if it is the case that
q, then A can waive her moral claim right against it being the case
that [both p and q]. To illustrate, consider Aliyah’s position in Mother.
Aliyah wants to give morally valid consent to Beau entering her
apartment on Friday if and only if Beau visits his mother on Wed-
nesday. Aliyah possesses a moral claim right against it being the case
that [Beau-enters-Aliyah’s-apartment-on-Friday]. Those who accept
the Conjunction Thesis believe that it follows that Aliyah also pos-
sesses a moral claim right against it being the case that [both Beau-
enters-Aliyah’s-apartment-on-Friday and Beau-visits-his-mother-on-
Wednesday]. Consequently, those who accept the Conjunction
Thesis have no problem explaining Mother as a case of moral scope
restriction: Aliyah restricts the descriptive content of her consent
token to waive this moral claim right, leaving intact her moral claim
right against it being the case that [both Beau-enters-Aliyah’s-apart-
ment-on-Friday and Beau-does-not-visit-his-mother-on-Wednesday].
The problem arises for those who deny the Conjunction Thesis.
For them, it does not necessarily follow from the fact that Aliyah
possesses a moral claim right against it being the case that [Beau-
enters-Aliyah’s-apartment-on-Friday] that Aliyah also possesses a
moral claim right against it being the case that [both Beau-enters-
Aliyah’s-apartment-on-Friday and Beau-visits-his-mother-on-Wed-
nesday]. As we learned from our discussion of Pen, for A to waive a
moral claim right, A must initially possess that moral claim right.
Consequently, if Aliyah does not possess a moral claim right against
it being the case that [both Beau-enters-Aliyah’s-apartment-on-Friday
and Beau-visits-his-mother-on-Wednesday], then Aliyah cannot
waive this right, and so it is not possible to explain Mother as a case of
moral scope restriction.
Does Aliyah possesses a moral claim right against it being the case
that [both Beau-enters-Aliyah’s-apartment-on-Friday and Beau-visits-
his-mother-on-Wednesday]? According to those who deny the
Conjunction Thesis, she might not. To see this, consider a view
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recently advanced by Hallie Liberto, which implicitly denies the
Conjunction Thesis. Liberto considers a case in which Jo and Casey
are having sexual intercourse—or, as Liberto puts it, ‘‘having sex’’. Jo
does not want Casey to have sexual intercourse with Jo if Casey is in
pain. On Liberto’s view, Jo possesses a moral claim right against
[Casey-having-sex-with-Jo], but Jo lacks a moral claim right against
[Casey-having-sex-with-Jo-while-Casey-is-in-pain].36 Putting Liberto’s
view in the terminology of this essay, Jo cannot waive a claim right
against it being the case that [both Casey-has-sexual-intercourse-with-
Jo and Casey-is-not-in-pain] while leaving intact her claim right
against it being the case that [both Casey-has-sexual-intercourse-with-
Jo and Casey-is-in-pain], because Jo does not possess these rights.37
There are different possible accounts of why someone might deny
the Conjunction Thesis. According to one possible account, which
we can call the Reasonable Demands account, whether A possesses a
moral claim right against it being the case that [p] depends on
whether it is reasonable for A to demand that not-p.38 On the Rea-
sonable Demands account, whether Jo possesses a moral claim right
against it being the case that [both Casey-has-sexual-intercourse-with-
Jo and Casey-is-not-in-pain] depends on whether it is reasonable for
Jo to demand that Casey not have sexual intercourse with Jo while
Casey is in pain. Let us assume for the sake of argument that it is not
reasonable, so that Jo lacks this right. We can now ask whether Jo
possesses a moral claim right against it being the case that [Casey-
has-sexual-intercourse-with-Jo]. Since it reasonable for Jo to demand
that Casey not have sexual intercourse with Jo, Jo possesses this
right. Reasonableness determines whether Jo possesses this right.
However, once Jo possesses the relevant right, Jo can choose whe-
ther or not to waive it for a range of reasons. For example, Jo can
decide not to waive her moral claim right against it being the case
that [Casey-has-sexual-intercourse-with-Jo] because Casey is in pain,
or because Casey does not share Jo’s taste for pop music. According
to the Reasonable Demands account, reasonableness constrains
36 Hallie Liberto, ‘‘Intention and Sexual Consent’’ Philosophical Explanations 20(S2) (2017): pp. S127–
S141, pp. S136–S138.
37 Liberto’s view is formulated in terms of the right that remains intact, whereas I have formulated
my examples in terms of the right that is waived.
38 For an account of rights along these lines, see Jonathan Quong ‘‘Rights Against Harm’’ Aristotelian
Society Supplementary Volume 89(1) (2015): pp. 249–266.
CONDITIONAL CONSENT
which rights an individual possesses, but it does not constrain how an
individual can exercise those rights.39
According to another possible account of which rights A pos-
sesses—the account that Liberto herself advances—whether A pos-
sesses a right depends on the scope of A’s realm of legitimate
discretion. Call this the Legitimate Discretion account. (If A’s realm of
legitimate discretion is equivalent to what A can reasonably demand
of others, then the Legitimate Discretion account is equivalent to the
Reasonable Demands account.) Now, whether Casey has sexual
intercourse with Jo is within Jo’s realm of legitimate discretion. This
explains why Jo possesses a right against it being the case that
[Casey-has-sexual-intercourse-with-Jo]. By contrast, Liberto main-
tains, whether Casey is in pain while having sexual intercourse with
Jo is something that falls outside of Jo’s realm of legitimate discre-
tion.40 On Liberto’s view, this explains why Jo lacks a right against it
being the case that [both Casey-has-sexual-intercourse-with-Jo and
Casey-is-not-in-pain]. Despite all this, Liberto maintains that if, while
having sexual intercourse to which Jo has initially given morally
valid consent, Jo comes to know that Casey is in pain, then Jo can
revoke her morally valid consent because Casey is in pain. Liberto
maintains that it is possible for Jo to do this even though whether
Casey is in pain while having sexual intercourse is outside Jo’s realm
of legitimate discretion. Moreover, Liberto maintains, if Casey tries
to initiate sexual intercourse with Jo, Jo can withhold her morally
valid consent because Casey is in pain. Speaking generally, Liberto
says that ‘‘A can refuse to waive her… right against B having sex
with A in light of finding out about any feature of the sexual
encounter, even those outside her own realm of discretion.’’41
I suspect that many people subscribe to the Reasonable Demands
account, the Legitimate Discretion account, or some similar account
of which rights A possesses—and, as a result—deny the Conjunction
Thesis. That said, which if any of these possible accounts is correct is
a difficult and contentious issue. Rather than take a stand on which
39 For a discussion of related issues, see Jeremy Waldron, ‘‘A Right to Do Wrong’’ Ethics 92(1)
(1981): pp. 21–39.
40 Liberto, ‘‘Intention and Sexual Consent’’ p. S135. This is easiest to imagine if Casey’s pain is
caused by something other than the intercourse itself—for example, by Casey’s pre-existing headache.
Whether Casey has sexual intercourse while he has a headache seems like it is in Casey’s realm of
legitimate discretion rather than Jo’s.
41 Liberto, ‘‘Intention and Sexual Consent’’ p. S138.
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of these possible accounts is correct, I shall assume for simplicity that
those who deny the Conjunction Thesis accept that Mother is a case
in which Aliyah possesses a right against it being the case that [Beau-
enters-Aliyah’s-apartment-on-Friday] without Aliyah possessing a
right against it being the case that [both Beau-enters-Aliyah’s-apart-
ment-on-Friday and Beau-visits-his-mother-on-Wednesday]. After all,
both the accounts just canvassed seem to generate this result. It
seems reasonable for Aliyah to demand that Beau not enter her
apartment on Friday, but at least arguably unreasonable to demand
that he also visits his mother on Wednesday. Likewise, whether
Beau enters Aliyah’s apartment on Friday seems within Aliyah’s
realm of legitimate discretion, but whether Beau also visits his
mother on Wednesday seems outside this realm. Those who dis-
agree with this verdict about Mother should feel free to substitute
another case in which A possesses a moral claim right against it being
the case that [p] but lacks a moral claim right against it being the case
that [both p and q].42
Now, if moral scope restriction is the only way for A to place
conditions on her morally valid consent to B’s action, then A cannot
place a condition on her morally valid consent to B’s action unless A
initially possesses the relevant right. We have assumed Aliyah lacks a
right against it being the case that [both Beau-enters-Aliyah’s-apart-
ment-on-Friday and Beau-visits-his-mother-on-Wednesday]. Accord-
ingly, if moral scope restriction is the only way for Aliyah to place
conditions on her morally valid consent, then Aliyah cannot give her
morally valid consent to Beau entering her apartment on Friday if
and only if he visits his mother on Wednesday. But this is coun-
terintuitive. Intuitively, this is possible. This gives those who deny
the Conjunction Thesis reason to believe that there is another way
for A to place conditions on her morally valid consent to B’s action.
A natural suggestion is that it is possible for A to conditionally token
consent. On that picture, Aliyah would waive her moral claim right
against it being the case that [Beau-enters-Aliyah’s-apartment-on-
Friday], but would do so conditionally on Beau’s visiting his mother
on Wednesday.
42 If the reader believes that there are no such cases, then the reader accepts the Conjunction Thesis.
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D. Can A Make the Truth of Any Proposition a Condition of A’s Tokening
Consent?
The idea of conditionally tokening consent raises a question: Is it
possible for A to make the truth of any proposition a condition on
A’s tokening consent?43 For many propositions, making their truth a
condition of A’s tokening consent seems unproblematic. For exam-
ple, it seems unproblematic for Aliyah to token consent to Beau’s
entering her apartment on Friday conditional on the truth of the
proposition ‘‘Beau visits his mother on Wednesday’’. But other
propositions might raise concerns—consider, ‘‘Beau murders his
mother on Wednesday’’ or ‘‘Beau believes that Aliyah does not
consent to his entering her apartment on Friday’’. Here is a prob-
lematic example from the sexual domain:
Climax. Agnes tokens consent to Barry’s having sexual intercourse with Agnes on the condition
that Agnes reaches sexual climax before Barry. Barry has sexual intercourse with Agnes. Barry
reaches sexual climax before Agnes.
If it is possible for Agnes to make the proposition ‘‘Agnes reaches
sexual climax before Barry’’ a condition of her tokening consent to
Barry’s having sexual intercourse with her, then this seems to yield
some concerning results. First, Barry has sexual intercourse with
Agnes without her morally valid consent to his doing so. Second, in
light of the Tracking Assumption, it ought to be the case that Barry
lacks Agnes’s legally valid consent to his having sexual intercourse
with her. Third, if Barry acts with the relevant mens rea (perhaps
because he knows he is an unskilled lover), then it follows that it
ought to be the case that Barry commits a criminal offence. This will
strike many—including myself—as an undesirable overreach of the
criminal law.
Given the diversity of possible conditions, answering the general
question of whether it is possible for A to make the truth of any
proposition a condition on A’s tokening consent would require at
least another essay. However, as we shall see shortly, we can make
progress with the legal debates about conditional consent to sexual
intercourse without answering this general question here.
43 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for encouraging me to address this question, and for the
Climax case that follows.
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IV. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS
Let us now return to the law of conditional consent to sexual
intercourse. We began with the question of whether that law ought
to be extended to cases like Linekar. We then made the Tracking
Assumption, which states that whether A gives legally valid consent
to B’s action ought to track whether A gives morally valid consent to
that action. We then saw that there are two distinct ways for one
person to place conditions on her morally valid consent to another’s
action. It follows that there are two distinct ways for a complainant
to place conditions on her morally valid consent to a defendant’s
having sexual intercourse with her. In this section, I use this dis-
tinction to argue that the law of conditional consent ought to be
extended to cases like Linekar, outlining two possible suggestions for
how the law might do this. I also briefly suggest that the distinction
helps us to understand how individuals place conditions on their
morally valid consent in other contexts.
Let us start by considering Assange. AA possessed a moral claim
right against it being the case that [Assange-had-sexual-intercourse-
with-AA]. Plausibly, AA also possessed a moral claim right against it
being the case that [both Assange-had-sexual-intercourse-with-AA and
Assange-wore-a-condom]. In more natural language, we can say that
AA plausibly had a right against it being the case that [Assange-had-
protected-sexual-intercourse-with-AA]. If that is correct, then AA
plausibly waived this right, leaving in place her moral claim right
against it being the case that [Assange-had-unprotected-sexual-inter-
course-with-AA]. If in these circumstances Assange had unprotected
sexual intercourse with AA, then he did something other than that to
which she gave her morally valid consent. If Assange did something
other than that to which AA gave her morally valid consent, then
Assange did not have AA’s morally valid consent to what he did. If
this is correct, then Assange involves moral scope restriction just like
Gynaecologist, in which Patient gives her morally valid consent to
Doctor’s inserting a medical instrument into Patient’s vagina, but
Doctor instead inserts his penis. What Doctor does is outside the
moral scope of Patient’s consent. Similarly, what Assange did was
outside the moral scope of AA’s consent.
Now consider Linekar. The prostitute possessed a moral claim
right against it being the case that [Linekar-had-sexual-intercourse-
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with-the-prostitute]. Did she also possess a moral claim right against
it being the case that [both Linekar-had-sexual-intercourse-with-the-
prostitute and Linekar-paid-the-prostitute-£25]? In more natural lan-
guage, we might ask, did the prostitute possess a right against it
being the case that [Linekar-had-paid-sexual-intercourse-with-the-
prostitute]?
Those who accept the Conjunction Thesis must answer yes.
According to them, the prostitute’s possession of a moral claim right
against it being the case that [Linekar-had-paid-sexual-intercourse-
with-the-prostitute] follows from her possession of the right against
it being the case that [Linekar-had-sexual-intercourse-with-the-pros-
titute]. If that is correct, then we can explain Linekar in terms of
moral scope restriction. By tokening consent to paid sexual inter-
course, the prostitute restricted the moral scope of her consent so as
to waive only her right against it being the case that [Linekar-had-
paid-sexual-intercourse-with-the-prostitute], leaving intact her right
against it being the case that [Linekar-had-unpaid-sexual-intercourse-
with-the-prostitute]. If that is correct, then Linekar involves moral
scope restriction just like Assange and Gynaecologist. The prostitute
gave her morally valid consent to Linekar having paid sexual inter-
course with her, but he instead had unpaid sexual intercourse with
her. Since what Linekar did was something other than that to which
the prostitute gave her morally valid consent, Linekar did not have
the prostitute’s morally valid consent to what he did.
Those who reject the Conjunction Thesis might answer no: The
prostitute did not possess a right against it being the case that
[Linekar-had-paid-sexual-intercourse-with-the-prostitute]. What if the
prostitute lacked this right? Even if those who reject the Conjunction
Thesis believe that the prostitute lacked this right, they should agree
that she possessed a right against it being the case that [Linekar-had-
sexual-intercourse-with-the-prostitute]. This is where the discussion
of conditionally tokening consent comes into play. Earlier, we put off
answering the general question of whether it is possible for A to
make the truth of any proposition a condition of A’s tokening con-
sent. Accordingly, if we are to invoke the notion of conditional
tokening in Linekar, we must now make the following assumption:
Payment Assumption: It is possible for A to token consent to B’s having sexual intercourse with A
conditional on the truth of the proposition ‘‘B pays A’’.
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The Payment Assumption is plausible. Indeed, many regard
payment as among the most plausible conditions for A to place on
A’s consent to B’s having sexual intercourse with A.44
Provided the Payment Assumption is true, we can think of Linekar
as a case in which the prostitute conditionally tokened consent to
Linekar having sexual intercourse with her, with the condition being
the truth of the proposition ‘‘Linekar paid the prostitute £25 after-
wards’’. On this view, Linekar’s paying the prostitute £25 was a
condition on her speech act of consent. Since tokening consent re-
quires a speech act, conditionally performing a speech act of consent
amounts to conditionally tokening consent. If the condition on the
speech act is not satisfied, then the prostitute has not tokened con-
sent. Since her tokening consent is a requirement for her giving
morally valid consent to Linekar’s having sexual intercourse with
her, it follows that she did not give her morally valid consent to
Linekar’s having sexual intercourse with her. On this picture, Line-
kar had sexual intercourse with the prostitute without her morally
valid consent.
If this picture is correct, then Linekar is a case of conditional
tokening just like Mother. Recall that in Mother, Beau’s visiting his
mother on Wednesday was a condition of Aliyah’s speech act of
consent to Beau’s entering Aliyah’s apartment on Friday. Since
tokening consent requires a speech act, conditionally performing a
speech act of consent amounts to conditionally tokening consent. If
the condition on the speech act is not satisfied, then Aliyah does not
token consent. Since her tokening consent is a requirement for her
giving morally valid consent to Beau’s entering her apartment on
Friday, it follows that Aliyah does not give her morally valid consent
to Beau’s entering her apartment on Friday. If Beau enters her
apartment on Friday, he does so without Aliyah’s morally valid
consent to his action.
The preceding discussion might help to explain the different
intuitions about Assange and Linekar. Recall that some commentators
have the intuition that there is an important difference between cases
like Assange and those like Linekar. We can now see why philo-
sophical argument might vindicate those intuitions as correct.
Whether those intuitions are correct depends on whether the
44 See, e.g., Joseph J. Fischel, Screw Consent (Oakland, CA: California University Press, 2019) p. 112.
CONDITIONAL CONSENT
complainants in each kind of case possess the relevant moral claim
right. If A possess a right against [B-having-protected-sexual-inter-
course-with-A] but not against [B-having-paid-sexual-intercourse-
with-A], then cases like Assange are cases of moral scope restriction,
whereas cases like Linekar are cases of conditionally tokening con-
sent. This is an important difference.
Recall that the commentators in the second set have the intuition
that a defendant who has sexual intercourse with a complainant in
breach of either condition—whether payment or condom use—does
so without the complainant’s valid consent to what he does. My
argument in this essay has been that this, too, is correct. Even if
there is an important difference between the conditions in the two
cases—namely, that one is a restriction on moral scope and the other
is a condition on tokening—a defendant who has sexual intercourse
with a complainant in breach of either kind of condition does so
without her morally valid consent to his action.
Currently, the law treats sexual intercourse in breach of a con-
dition as non-consensual only where what the defendant does falls
outside the moral scope of the complainant’s consent. But if I am
correct, then a defendant who has sexual intercourse with a com-
plainant in breach of a condition she places on her consent token also
has sexual intercourse with the complainant without her morally
valid consent to his action. In light of the Tracking Assumption, it
ought to be the case that the defendant in such cases lacks the
complainant’s legally valid consent to what he does.
Should the law treat sexual intercourse in breach of a condition
on tokening in any way differently from sexual intercourse in breach
of a restriction on moral scope?45 I suggest the answer is yes. I have
argued that there are three distinct ways in which a defendant might
lack a complainant’s morally valid consent to his having sexual
intercourse with her. First, the complainant might not token con-
sent—for example, where she is unconscious throughout the rele-
vant period. Second, the complainant’s consent might not be
valid—for example, if it is induced by coercion. Third, the com-
plainant might give morally valid consent to something other than his
having sexual intercourse with her—for example, his performing
surgery on her. I suggest that these different ways in which a
45 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for encouraging me to make this explicit.
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defendant might lack the complainant’s morally valid consent to
sexual intercourse should be reflected in the law.
Currently, English criminal law does not make such distinctions.
For example, it uses the same offence to criminalise the behaviour of
the defendant who has sexual intercourse with an unconscious
complainant, the defendant who coerces a complainant into sexual
intercourse, and the defendant who engages in sexual intercourse
instead of performing medical treatment.46 However, many theorists
have called for more fine-grained individuation of sexual offences,
mainly based on considerations of fair labelling.47 Although the
defendant lacks the complainant’s morally valid consent to sexual
intercourse in each of the cases outlined above, the reason why is
different in each case. I suggest that the law should acknowledge this
difference. The best way for it to do this, I suggest, is through the
finer grained individuation of offences, such as sexual-assault-by-lack-
of-tokening-of-consent, sexual-assault-by-lack-of-validity-of-consent,
and sexual-assault-by-acting-outside-the-scope-of-consent. Indeed,
sexual-assault-by-lack-of-tokening-of-consent should plausibly be
subdivided further, to reflect the fact that a defendant might lack the
complainant’s token of consent due either to the complainant’s
condition not being satisfied (as was arguably the case in Linekar) or
to the fact that the complainant never even conditionally tokened
consent (as where the complainant is unconscious).
How, then, should the law be extended to cover cases like Line-
kar? This depends on whether they are cases of moral scope
restriction or conditional tokening. If they are cases of moral scope
restriction, then the defendant’s behaviour should be criminalised
using the offence that should be used to criminalise the defendant’s
behaviour in Assange, namely, sexual-assault-by-acting-outside-the-
scope-of-consent.48 On the other hand, if they are cases of condi-
tional tokening, then they should plausibly be criminalised using a
46 The offence committed depends on precisely which acts the sexual intercourse involved. See fn.
15, above.
47 For different suggestions about how to individuate sexual offences, see Matthew Gibson, ‘‘De-
ceptive Sexual Relations: A Theory of Criminal Liability’’ Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 40(1) (2020): pp.
82–109; Tom Dougherty ‘‘Affirmative Consent and Due Diligence’’ Philosophy and Public Affairs 46(1)
(2018): pp. 90–112, pp. 109–112; Amit Pundik, ‘‘Coercion and Deception in Sexual Relations’’ Canadian
Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 28(1) (2015): pp. 97–127; Victor Tadros, ‘‘Rape without Consent’’ Oxford
Journal of Legal Studies 26(3) (2006): pp. 515–543.
48 We may wish to have a variant on these offences called rape-by-acting-outside-of-the-scope-of-
consent, etc, depending on precisely which acts the intercourse involves. See fn. 15, above.
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different sexual offence, namely, the appropriate subdivision of
sexual-assault-by-lack-of-tokening-of-consent.
In applying the distinction between moral scope restriction and
conditional tokening, I have in this essay focused on the law of
conditional consent to sexual intercourse. But the distinction be-
tween moral scope restriction and conditionally tokening consent
applies well beyond this. As a result, the distinction might also help
us to understand how individuals place conditions on their morally
valid consent in other contexts. Since I do not have space to pursue
this issue at length here, a full analysis will have to wait for another
occasion.
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